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Scale invariance versus translation variance in Nash bargaining 
problem 
 
Abstract 
 
Nash’s solution in his celebrated article on the bargaining problem calling for 
maximization of product of marginal utilities is revisited; a different line of 
argument supporting such a solution is suggested by straightforward or more direct 
reasoning, and a conjecture is raised which purports uniqueness of algorithm, 
namely his solution. Other alternative inferior algorithms are also suggested. It is 
argued in this article that the scale invariance principle for utility functions should 
and could be applied here, namely that utility rescaling u’=a*u is allowed, while 
translations, adding a constant to utility functions u’=u+b could not be applied 
here, since it is not invariant and leads to contradictory behavior. Finally, special 
situations of ownership and utilities, where trading is predicted not to take place at 
all because none is profitable are examined, and then shown to be consistent with 
the scale invariance principle. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
[1] Two-person Bargaining Problem 
 
John Nash’s article “The Bargaining Problem” relates to the classical economic 
problem of two parties freely bargaining with each other. In this situation, subsets 
of two original sets of items belonging to two individuals are possibly exchanged 
voluntarily if the sum of utilities is increased for both players.  
 
The two opponents or players are each in possession of items that have utilities to 
both, and who engage in direct bartering without the use of money. Each wishes to 
convince the other to give away as many and most valuable items as possible in 
exchange for the fewest and least valuable items. A proposal of exchange involves 
a specific offer as well as a specific demand, where ‘offer’ and ‘demand’ refer to 
the details of the proposal.  For example: “I offer the set R and I demand in 
exchange the set K”.   
 
We shall use the following notation for the utility functions of X and Y:  
the-person-possessing-the itemITEMthe-person-for-whom-utility-is-considered.  
For example:  xAy would mean the utility to Y of an item named A which X 
possesses originally. 
 Each possible exchange, whether reasonable or not, can be drawn on the Ux vs. Uy 
plane, where Ux and Uy refer to the marginal utilities of X and Y respectively, that 
is, the sum of utilities after an exchange is made minus the original sum of utilities 
of the items they owned, or equivalently, the sum of utilities of new items gotten 
(gained) minus the sum of utilities of items given out (lost). 
 
It is very clear that only points in the first quadrant on the boundary/periphery (and 
not on the axes) are candidates for a solution, because any points inside (where 
there is room to go upward and/or to the right) are worse off for both players as 
compared with the boundary/periphery. For example, (3, 6) would not be 
considered at all if (5, 7) is also available with a different exchange, since the latter 
point offers more for X as well as more for Y. The existence of (3, 7) would also 
preclude the inferior point (3, 6) even though it’s only worse off for Y. Moreover, 
Nash introduces the possibility of X and Y tossing a variable bias coin, with 
probability p on (0, 1) to decide between any two points on the periphery, hence 
creating a continuous line there. Note that this line includes linear connections 
between all points, and not only between adjacent ones on the periphery, thus 
resulting in an overall curve that is not the same as simply connecting adjacent 
points on the periphery, but rather a curve that encloses more area.  The only 
question that remains then is “where exactly on that boundary?” and Nash’s 
answer is that we look for an algorithm that maximizes Ux*Uy. Without any loss of 
generality, in this article, we would deemphasize or downplay the continuous line 
approach taken by Nash and instead focus only on those discrete points of actual 
deterministic exchanges. One severe consequence or limitation though of the 
discrete approach is that there are cases where maximum Ux*Uy is not unique, 
whereas the continuous approach always guarantees uniqueness; hence an essential 
part of Nash’s edifice was the joining of the points with this crooked yet 
continuous line. Examples of multiple maximum Ux*Uy with the discrete approach 
abound.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[2] Scale Invariance Principle 
 
It is noted that Nash’s solution point is scale invariant. The algorithm of 
maximizing Ux* Uy would always point to the same transformed point (and the 
same items being exchanged – the same deal) regardless of scale. This is so 
because the maximum of a set of real numbers is scale-invariant in the sense that 
the same point (original/transformed) always serves as the maximum.  
IF            Max{X1, X2, X3, … , Xn} = Xi  (for some unique i in the index to n ) 
THEN    Max{Q*X1, Q* X2, Q*X3, … , Q*Xn} = Q*Xi  (same i as above!!) 
(where Q is any real positive number). 
 
For example: 
 
IF           Max{4, 7, 20, 3, 6, 10} = 20  (and it’s the 3rd element) 
THEN   Max 2*{4, 7, 20, 3, 6, 10} = Max{8, 14, 40, 6, 12, 20} = 40 
                                                                                (and it’s also the 3rd element) 
 
Moreover, any exchange where both X and Y are happy under original utility 
functions would continue to be rendered profitable to both after any transformation 
of scales ! 
 
To illustrate this, assume Y originally agrees to give X {A, B, C, D, … (M items)} 
and X agrees to give Y {P, Q, R, S,  … (N items)} in exchange. To express the 
original agreement and satisfaction for both sides regarding this exchange, and 
taking first the point of view of X, we then must have: 
 
    X extra satisfaction in obtaining {A, B, C, D, …  M items}  > 
                                  >   X losses in not possessing {P, Q, R, S,  … (N items)}  
or : 
                                       
       yAx+yBx+yCx +… M items  >    xPx+xQx+… N items 
 
Now under scale transformation of the utility function of X by b (when b > 0),  
that is u’---> b*u we have to compare the two quantities 
 
[ b*(yAx)+b*(yBx)+b*(yCx)+ … M items ] and [ b*(xPx)+b*(xQx)+… N items ]  
 
       or, by pulling out the common factor b : 
 
[ b*(yAx+yBx+yCx+ … M items) ]    and   [ b*(xPx+xQx+ … N items)] 
 for which the previous inequality above guarantees that the left side is bigger than 
the right side, regardless of the value of b. Same argument would apply to Y of 
course, and which completes the proof. The exact same line of argument above can 
be used to show that for any exchange refused by either X or Y or both under 
original utility function would also be resisted under any rescaling where b>0. To 
do that we simply flip the direction of the inequality above from  >  to  < and all 
else follow just the same. Hence any decision to trade for this two-person 
bargaining problem case is unaffected by any scale transformation, and 
therefore scale-invariant. 
 
The scale-invariance property of Nash’s solution is not incidental. Solution (as 
well as everything else here) should not change if we re-scale utilities of X or Y or 
both. This is so because utility function itself is defined only up to scale. Hence if u 
is a utility function of X, than a*u is also a valid utility function. This expresses the 
fact that utility function is nothing but an expression of comparisons of preferences 
in owning one thing as oppose to another. For example, u(bike)=8 and u(book)=2 
mean that the person derives four times as much satisfaction from a bike as 
compared with a book. Yet there is nothing intrinsic or important about the values 
8 and 2. If we rescale everything by say 5, now u(bike)=40 and u(book)=10, we 
would still have the same ratio of satisfaction, namely four-fold, and it’s this ratio 
that constitutes the real measure of preferences of utility, expressing the consistent 
fact that for that person four books satisfy him or her just as much as only one bike 
would, regardless of scale. Hence scale-invariance comes very naturally here. It is 
in this sense perhaps that utility values are thought of as using some arbitrary 
“satisfaction scale” or ”happiness units” , just as the kilos, grams, and pounds are 
used for weights, especially or conveniently so when the least-valued item could be 
given the arbitrary value of 1. 
 
 
 
[3] Translations are not invariant! 
 
Difficulties arise though when translations are considered. The other axiom of 
utility functions is that translated utilities are all equivalent expressions of 
satisfaction. In other words, that for any utility function u, u+b is also a valid utility 
function. But translations are harder to interpret. Say u(bike)=8 and u(book)=2, and 
now u is translated by +5, hence u(bike)=13 and u(book)=7, and so original ratios 
of satisfaction are totally upset! Moreover, if translation is performed using a value 
much larger than the largest value of the original utility function then in the limit 
each item is assigned equal value – clearly a false representation of preferences and 
satisfaction order! For example, in the case above where u(bike)=8 and u(book)=2, 
and where b is 1000 say, translated utilities are u(bike)=1008 and u(book)=1002, 
and are of almost identical values.  
 
Moreover, here trades are NOT even translation-invariant! In other words, a 
given exchange acceptable to both X and Y under original utility function 
would be rendered as totally unacceptable under a certain utility translation!  
 
To illustrate this, assume Y originally agrees to give X {A, B, C, D, … (M items)} 
and X agrees to give Y {P, Q, R, S,  … (N items)} in exchange. To express the 
original agreement and satisfaction for both sides regarding this exchange, and 
taking first the point of view of X, we then must have: 
 
    X extra satisfaction in obtaining {A, B, C, D, …  (M items)}   > 
                                   >   X losses in not possessing {P, Q, R, S,  … (N items)}  
 
or : 
                               
     yAx+yBx+yCx +… M items  >    xPx+xQx+… N items 
 
Now under translation of utility function of X by b, that is u ----> u+b we have to 
compare the two quantities 
 
[(yAx+b)+(yBx+b)+(yCx+b)+… M items ] and [ (xPx+b)+(xQx+b)+… N items ]    
 
or : 
 
[(yAx+yBx+yCx +… M items) +M*b ]   and  [ (xPx+xQx + … N items) +  N*b ] 
 
for which the previous inequality above does not by any means guarantee a similar 
inequality here, unless b is relatively very small. If M=N or if M>N then the 
inequality still holds true, but whenever M<N things depend on the relative value 
of b. When b is extremely large, satisfaction in general (in the limit) is calculated 
by simply counting the number of items exchanged, regardless of type, and in such 
a case all depends solely on the relative value of N and M! 
 
 
 
 
 Another strong consideration against allowing translation of utility functions is for 
situations when an item deemed totally useless is being possessed, say children 
clothes for a family without kids, etc., and in which case the original utility value 
for such an item is naturally zero. Yet, in this case, translation would result in a 
non-zero positive value for such an item, while rescaling would always guarantee a 
consistent zero value no matter what scale is chosen.  
 
Hence it is necessary to disallow translation of utility function altogether and 
insist on rescaling as the only possibility at least in the context of this 
particular two-person bargaining situation. 
 
 
It is for this property of the utility function leading to scale-invariance here that 
neither X nor Y would ever “complain about fairness” if solution supposedly is at 
(X0, Y0) and X0 > Y0 or visa versa. This is so because with a simple rescaling we 
could easily reverse the situation and obtain X0 < Y0 and then perhaps X would 
complain now, etc. On the contrary! The correct perspective or view here runs 
much deeper! Neither would complain about fairness at all, as neither of them is 
concerned about how the other person is fairing, nor comparing his or her overall 
utility to that of the other. Rather, all Y is trying to do is to obtain a point as high as 
possible on the Ux and Uy  plane, while X is striving to obtain a point as much to 
the right as possible. The only solution point that could consistently be considered 
unfair to say Y is (X0, 0), namely on the X axis, in which case no rescaling could 
ever reverse the favorable situation that X enjoys here. 
 
 
[4] Naturalness of Maximum Marginal Utilities 
 
Deemphasize the continuous line approach taken by Nash and focusing solely on 
those discrete points, it is rather intuitive or natural that we’ll look for or find the 
solution at maximum Ux* Uy rather than anything else. We are in need of an 
algorithm that is (1) fair to both, (2) beneficial to both, (3) unique, and (4) scale 
invariant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 First, it is clear that both Ux  and  Uy must be somehow involved or present in any 
expression or algorithm, otherwise one would be considered as being discriminated 
against the other. Of the four basic arithmetic operations, only addition and 
multiplication can be used interchangeably without any preference regarding 
operands, while subtraction Ux  -  Uy and division Ux  /  Uy   are intrinsically 
preferential operations, treating Ux and Uy in different ways, hence should be 
excluded here all together. Expressions such as (Ux
 
5 
* Uy 
2) or (Ux)Uy  would also 
not be acceptable as it discriminates against Y and favors X or visa versa.  
Secondly, what is needed here is a decisive algorithm, operation, or procedure that 
points to a unique point, not multiple ones. Let us now then compare maximizing 
Ux+Uy (addition) with maximizing Ux* Uy (multiplication). Evidently 
multiplication is superior here because product is one operation that is maximized 
only when both Ux and Uy are not small (and especially not close to zero), and so 
in that sense, by maximizing the product of the two marginal utilities we consider 
the interests of both X and Y equally and fairly.  On the other hand, maximization 
of Ux+ Uy can be done (if we wish) totally at the expense of one of them. We might 
even find cases where the sum is being maximized while one quantity say Ux is 
zero, a situation or a solution which does not reflect our case given that trading is 
voluntary for both players and that they are of equal knowledge of utilities and of 
equal bargaining power. Another strong consideration against maximizing Ux+ Uy 
is that it’s not scale invariance. For example, if we rescale utility of (only) X by a 
huge factor, things would swing much in X favor as maximization of  Ux+ Uy will 
now end up focusing much more on X than on Y. Another drawback of maximum 
Ux+ Uy is that it could yield multiple solutions whenever boundary points farthest 
from the origin (i.e. the best points) fall on the equidistance line   Ux+ Uy = C. And 
what other methods would X and Y would agree upon? Maximizing 
(1/Ux)*(1/Uy)? Minimizing Ux* Uy? Certainly not, as it would hurt both. Finding 
the point closest to the meaningless line X=Y which vary with scale? surely not! 
Both X and Y would like to maximize quantities here, not to minimize, nor to set 
quantities equal to anything when scales are totally meaningless. There seems to 
be no other reasonable algorithm we can come up with besides maximizing 
the product Ux * Uy! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consider the case of 2-object gravitational force, F = G*M1*M2/R2. Say we have a 
fixed amount of matter, 10 kilograms, where mass is flexible so that we can draw 
from one box of matter and into another as much as we wish, in the same vein as 
zero-sum or constant-sum situations. Distance is fixed at 10 meters say. The 
question then arises, under what arrangement of matter do we get maximum 
gravitational force? Here is the table: 
 
M1 M2 M1*M2 F 
0 10 0 0 
1 9 9 6.00 E-12 
2 8 16 1.06 E-11 
3 7 21 1.40 E-11 
4 6 24 1.60 E-11 
5 5 25 1.66 E-11 
6 4 24 1.60 E-11 
7 3 21 1.40 E-11 
8 2 16 1.06 E-11 
9 1 9 6.00 E-12 
10 0 0 0 
 
 
Hence, by keeping the two weights as even as possible, that is by dividing them 
equally, we obtain maximum product, while extreme inequality yielded zero. 
Hence, in general it can be said that maximizing product of constant-sum variables 
entails the most equal division possible! Yet this conclusion can not be separated 
from the fact that rescaling here say only M1 leaving M2 in tact is forbidden. Only 
simultaneous and equal rescaling is allowed here to uphold any meaning to the 
restriction M1 + M2 = 10, and that rescaling should be applied to the number 10 as 
well, comparing apples to apples not to bananas. 
 
 
In our context, this would point to a “fair” solution at (C/2, C/2) for all the discrete 
points on the line of  Ux+ Uy = C.   Surely, almost all typical curves in bargaining 
games are convex as opposed to straight lines, and one-sided rescaling is surely 
allowed, yet some principle of “fairness” in maximizing products is demonstrated 
by this physical example. 
 
 
 An intriguing and totally different line of thought is that mathematically speaking 
there may not exist any other algorithm arriving at a unique point except 
maximization of Ux*Uy - if we wish to be fair to both, to benefit both as much 
as possible, and for the algorithm to be scale invariant. 
In other words, there is simply no other algorithm that could differentiate between 
the various points available on the periphery and point to a unique one except 
maximizing Ux*Uy ! If so, then say Y is unhappy about the end result of 
maximizing Ux*Uy , and so Y tries hard to convince X to choose another point  
(X0, Y0). In that case Y wouldn’t be able to back up this point by appealing to any 
algorithm. Y would simply have to arbitrarily insist or ask X to move to that point 
without being able to say anything in support of his suggestion! 
 
 
[5] Other Algorithms 
 
The only other scale-invariant algorithm perhaps that could be proposed here, 
uniquely pointing to a special point on the periphery in a way which is (at first 
glance) fair to both X and Y is the following: 
Algorithm A) Count all those discrete points on the periphery (excluding points on 
the axes) and choose the middle one if they are odd, or the midpoint (tossing a 
biased coin) between the two most-centralized points if they are even, in the same 
spirit as in the definition of the median. This algorithm is scale invariant! 
 
This algorithm could work well for our discrete-points approach in this article. But 
with the inclusion of lines generated by tossing a deciding coin, - the continuous 
approach suggested by Nash - there would be nothing special about this (supposed) 
most-centralized point! Nor could we choose some midpoint, by way of measuring 
the distance, along the zigzagged line for the continuous approach, as it is scale-
dependent, and hence meaningless. 
Furthermore, the apparent fairness in this approach is misleading and the 
disadvantage is revealed in cases where the points on the periphery crowd out 
unevenly close to one axis and are sparse and spread out next to the other axis, for 
example: 
 
  
Ux Uy 
product 
Ux*Uy comments 
0 32.0 0.0  excluded 
1 31.5 31.5   
3 31.0 93.0   
5 30.5 152.5   
6 30.0 180.0   
7 29.5 206.5   
9 28.0 252.0 centralized  
11 27.0 297.0   
16 24.0 384.0   
21 21.0 441.0   
27 17.0 459.0 max Ux*Uy 
34 9.0 306.0   
39 0.0 0.0  excluded 
 In this case, the central point (9,  28) is not quite acceptable to X who would very 
much prefer the point (27, 17) where Ux*Uy is maximized. Note that this dislike of 
X here regarding choosing the most centralized point is independent of scale. 
Should X rescale his utility function by a factor much bigger than 1 or by a tiny 
fraction of 1 (close to 0) his or her dislike of such a solution would remain in tact 
and X would always seek to convince Y to agree on maximum Ux*Uy  - a 
proposition Y would not view negatively nor as unreasonable. 
A very different approach combining the concern for the two issues at hand here - 
fairness and scale invariance, is to force one final ‘fair’ rescaling before 
performing any algorithm or calculations. This done, any subsequent algorithm can 
now be made fairly disregarding scale altogether, and permitting procedures that 
are scale-dependent. This is done by equating (via rescaling) the X and Y distances 
of the two extreme points regarding all 4 quadrants. An alternative way would be 
to equate X and Y distances of the curve considering only the first quadrant for the 
purpose, hence rescaling both X and Y such that (r, 0) and (0, s) [or their closest 
points if none of the points falls on the axes] would be of the same length after 
transformation, that is (k, 0) and (0, k). We shall call this “equitable rescaling”. 
Algorithm B)   Perform equitable rescaling, then choose the point which 
maximizes X+Y. The difficulty here is that there may be no unique solution here, 
even though the zigzagged line connecting the points is concave. 
Algorithm C)   Perform equitable rescaling, then choose the point closest to the 45 
degrees line X=Y. 
Algorithm D)   Perform equitable rescaling, then measure the total distance on the 
zigzagged line to choose the point half way through on that curve. We could either 
do it by creating the zigzagged line considering strictly only adjacent points, or the 
more encompassing approach given by Nash.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 [6] Cases Having no Profitable Trades 
The force driving the exchange is the different valuations placed by X and Y for 
some of the items, implying that each possible exchange could in principle 
represent a totally different pair of sums of utilities.  There would have been no 
incentive whatsoever to trade had utilities were the same for both players for each 
item, that is if  xZx = xZy  and  yZy = yZx for any item Z.  In such a case, all the 
points on the Ux and Uy plane appear along the line Y = -X going through the 
origin, since in any exchange here the gain for X (net of some utilities gained and 
some lost) is exactly the loss for Y. For example, say X gives out three items with 
total utilities 30 (valued equally), and gets from Y two items with total utilities 34 
(valued equally), resulting in Ux = +4 and Uy = -4. 
Should we rescale here, say utilities of X are to be multiplied by a factor of 2; this 
would only mean that the X axis was stretched to double its original size, resulting 
in a line through the origin with a slope of -0.5 instead. It was proven earlier in this 
article, in absolute generality, that all trade decisions are independent of scale.  
 
Another situation where no trade could ever be made possible is depicted as 
follow: for each item X possesses the satisfaction derived from it for X is greater 
than that for Y, AND ALSO visa versa. In other words, for any item Z possessed 
by either X or Y we have iZi>iZj  (indexes i  and  j  representing X or Y). This 
precludes any possibility of trading. For example:  
  
 
X possesses radio Laptop Book watch Pen 
utility to X: 11 8 5 6 4 
utility to Y: 4 3 1 1 3 
 
 
Y possesses bike TV Cell chair 
utility to Y: 7 3 11 6 
utility to X: 4 2 10 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Let’s see why any possibility of one-to-one trade is precluded. Repeated use of the 
transitive rule for inequality will be made here, namely that if A>B and B>C then 
A>C. Say X possesses item A, and Y possesses item C, among some other items, 
and our particular situation is depicted as xAx>xAy and yCy>yCx, hence a trade of 
item A for item C in which X is benefiting from the exchange gives yCx>xAx 
(gaining from C more than losing on A) and this implies that yCx>xAy (because of 
xAx>xAy).  Now, from yCy>yCx we see that yCy>xAy, meaning that the loss of 
C for Y is greater than Y’s gain in acquiring A, and therefore Y could not be 
benefiting from such a trade!   
Similar argument can be made in general for ANY numbers of items traded, say  
Y gives X {A, B, C, D, … (M items)} and X gives Y {P, Q, R, S,  … (N items)}, 
keeping in mind that in here the condition implies that for any item Z we have 
iZi>iZj  - namely that the original owner obtains more satisfaction than the other 
person for any item possessed. 
Assume X would benefit and agree to such a trade as above, this would imply that 
(gains>losses):  
 
[yAx+yBx+yCx +… M items]  >   [xPx+xQx+… N items]  
 
and employing rule iZi>iZj  to the right side of the inequality we get: 
 
[yAx+yBx+yCx +… M items]  >   [xPy+xQy+… N items]  
 
Now comparing the left side of this inequality to [yAy+yBy+yCy +… M items], 
we note that the latter quantity is superior (again because of  iZi>iZj ), and so we 
finally get: 
 
[yAy+yBy+yCy +… M items] > [xPy+xQy+… N items]   
 
Hence clearly the loss of Y from not owning {A, B, C, etc.} is greater than Y’s 
gain from newly acquired items {P, Q, R, etc.}, and therefore Y would refuse to 
trade as such! 
 
The scale invariance principle applies. Doubling utilities of X would make the gap 
with Y wider for items X possesses but narrow it or even reverse the situation for 
items Y possesses.  If X or Y refuses any trade under some given utility functions, 
then they should continue to resist such an exchange under any rescaling of utilities 
as was proven earlier.  
 
A third example of a situation where no trade could ever be made possible is when 
the SUM of utility values for (say) X regarding ALL the items possessed by Y is 
LESS than the value X places on ANY of his own items (or equivalently: LESS 
than the MIN value X has for his own items.) In this case no amount of satisfaction 
from items belonging to Y can ever be awarded to X to compensate for the loss of 
even one single item he possesses, even the one least valued.  For example: 
 
X possesses: Radio Laptop book watch Pen 
utility to X: 14 12 13 12 13 
utility to Y: 10 16 7 17 5 
 
Y possesses: Bike TV cell chair     
utility to Y: 2 8 13 2    
utility to X: 3 1 4 3 = 11 
 
Any rescaling of utility values of X would involve the same multiplicative factor G 
say, for the transformation for items possessed by X as well as for items possessed 
by Y, hence transformed utility sum of all the items Y possesses is still for X less 
than the transformed value for any of his own items. This is consistent with the 
general scale invariance principle proven earlier.  
 
It is noted that in this last example, a one-way inequality is a sufficient condition to 
preclude trading, as oppose to the earlier example where mutual inequality was a 
necessary condition, namely iZi>iZj  as well as  jZj>jZi . 
 
 
[7] General Considerations 
 
To facilitate numerical analysis Nash makes the assumption that ‘ultimate’ or 
‘ideal’ utility for each player, his or her overall goal, is simply the sum of the 
utilities of the individual items he or she possesses.  In reality this is certainly not 
true.  The first loaf of bread has much higher overall utility than the 10th loaf.  One 
house and a loaf of bread have a much higher overall utility than either two loafs 
(full belly but staying outside in the cold) or two houses (spacious living space but 
with a hungry stomach). Nonetheless, an analysis based on the more realistic 
assumption of the combinatorial effect on overall utility would follow the same 
line of reasoning as outlined in Nash’s article given the more detailed ‘ultimate 
utility function’ which yields unique values for each and every combination of 
items, leading to a more realistic set of points on the Ux and Uy plane for 
determinations of max Ux*Uy . 
 It is interesting to note that the uniqueness of solution referred to in Nash’s article 
is not about the expected details of the exchange (what items exactly are being 
exchanged) but rather about the expected overall utilities for the two players after a 
deal is struck, values which at times could be achieved in more than one way of 
exchange and in which case exact details of exchange couldn’t be predicted at all. 
To demonstrate this, imagine the case where player X possesses two items, A and 
B, and derives equal satisfaction from either one, and where Y also derives equal 
satisfaction here, that is,  xAx = xBx  and  xAy = xBy, while solution involves X 
giving out to Y one of these two items. There is no way to predict which item 
exactly X will give up, so solution is not unique in that sense.  
 
 
Implicitly, Nash offers the use of the brute force method, namely, to check the 
entire list of all possible exchanges and sort out maximum Ux*Uy. Even with the 
elimination of negative and zero marginal utilities this leaves the computer 
performing combinatorial number of operations which increases exponentially as 
the number of items possessed becomes large. One intriguing question is whether 
or not there exists a way to cut directly to the solution, in the same vein as when 
the gradient seeks out the maximum and minimum of multivariable functions by 
cutting right through to it, avoiding the brute force tedious way. Attempts to devise 
an algorithm consisting of numerous little logical or very “reasonable” exchanges 
leading to the final solution are doom to failure. A sequence of one-for-one 
exchanges of items that increase sums of utilities to both players will not do. This 
is so because such an algorithm couldn’t capture the benefits presented by 
simultaneous multi exchanges.  
 
 
It is hard to imagine how two rational players during Adam Smith’s era living 
without the benefit of computers could calculate and arrive at the optimal solution 
when number of all possible trades is really huge as in the case when items to be 
exchanged are quite numerous. If X possesses P items and Y possesses Q items, 
then there are 2(P+Q) possible exchanges, including the case of the null exchange - 
where nobody gives anything out nor takes anything, that is, keeping the original 
situation of ownership in tact. Many of those 2(P+Q) possible exchanges though 
converge onto identical points on the Ux and Uy plane whenever resultant Ux and 
Uy are equivalent, hence total number of points typically is much less than that and 
often folds into something like a two-thirds, a half, or even around a third of the 
maximum potential of 2(P+Q) points. 
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